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How much environmental ethics should we write into law? Care for our 
environment is something on which we must gain minimal consensus, but 
also something that will require considerable enforcement. Not all duties are 
matters of justice, but many are. If you doubt that, try stealing. Or killing. 
Or raping. Or dumping hazardous wastes (maybe a kind of killing, stealing, 
or raping). Our inquiry is how far such enforcement is and ought to be so, 
how far environmental ethics is, in this larger sense, environmental justice. 
Politically, "command and control" solutions are out of vogue; what we 
need instead, many cry, are "incentives," Even incentives, such as pollution 
permits, operate against a background of required compliance. They sweeten 
the obedience to environmental law, and introduce some voluntary choices, 
but the insistent command is still there. We dangle carrots up front, but at 
the rear we hold a stick. 
Ethically, law-like forms of ethics are also out of vogue; what we need 
instead, many cry, is "caring." Others emphasize "virtues." Caring, virtuous 
persons need no rules. That may be true in later stages of personal moral 
development; but in public life, caring in concert needs regulation. The 
virtuous ahead, up front, may need no laws; but those at the rear, and most 
of us along the way, need enforcement, reinforcement – which helps us move 
along. Rules channel caring and discipline virtuous intentions. To this issue 
we will return. 
1 Legislating environmental care 
You may be surprised how much is enforced, and at how many levels, from 
Acts of Congress to lighting campfires. Starting at the top, recall a dozen 
examples from over one hundred Acts of the US Congress. 
●   Clean Air Act (1955), Amendments (1963, 1965, 1969, 1977, renewed 
1970, 1990) 
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●   Wild and Scenic Rivers Act (1968) 
●   Wilderness Act (1964) 
●   National Environmental Policy Act (1969) 
●   Marine Mammal Protection Act (1972) 
●   Endangered Species Act (1973, 1982), Amendments (1976, 1977, 1978, 
     1979, 1980) 
●   National Forest Management Act (1976) 
●   Federal Land Policy and Management Act (1976) 
●   International Environmental Protection Act (1983) 
●   Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
    Act (Superfund) (1980), Amendments (1986) 
●   Clean Water Act (1987) 
●   Emergency Wetlands Resources Act (1986) 
With agency and court interpretation, these acts enforce much environ-
mental behavior. If you doubt this, try shooting a bald eagle, or filling a 
wetland, or riding a motorbike in a designated wilderness. Following the last 
quarter century of environmental law and regulation, enforced by the 
Environmental Protection Agency, no-one in the United States today can do 
business legally in the manner in which our parents and grandparents 
routinely conducted business. 
Internationally, there are over 150 international environmental agree-
ments registered with the United Nations, and these are often enforced by 
the participating nations (United Nations Environment Programme, 1991; 
and see below). Two examples are the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) (1973) and the United 
Nations Convention on Biological Diversity (1992). If you are caught trying 
to bring a snow leopard skin into the United States, you will find yourself in 
prison with a fine of tens of thousands of dollars. 
More locally, with state and local governments, court decisions, actions of 
regulatory agencies, such as the US Fish and Wildlife Service, or even 
decisions of the district rangers, this enforcement enlarges, ramifies, and 
becomes quite detailed. Go elk hunting a day early, and you may end up in 
jail with your weapon confiscated. Do you want to do a master's thesis in 
wildlife biology? Your project is to find out among antelopes what 
proportion of males and females survive the winter, with a view to changing 
the hunting season for better survival of the herd. Fail to fill in a permit 
form detailing whether you have used the most humane method of capture, 
and the Animal Welfare Committee for the Colorado Division of Wildlife, 
on which I sit, will cancel your project. 
Anyone who backpacks in Colorado wilderness is prohibited from 
camping within 100 feet of lakes, streams, trails. That zone is often where 
nearly all the desirable campsites are. Two years back, in the Rawah 
Wilderness, after a hard day's climb, partly because there was more snow at 
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the treeline lakes than expected, I took extra effort to find a legal site. I 
pitched a late camp, only to find the next day, alas, behind my tent, half 
buried yet in the snow, a trail that I had not seen. 
Sure enough, the backcountry ranger came through, and asked me to 
move my tent. Fortunately he appeared late the second day; I was leaving the 
next morning, so he relented. But he had the legal power, and if I had 
insisted on staying on there despite his orders, I would have been taken to 
court. I spent the evening without the campfire I wished, since fires are 
prohibited in the subalpine zones. Add up these enforcements, great and 
small, and one could probably conclude that, far from environmental ethics 
being optional and voluntary, to the contrary, most of it is enforced. 
Environmental ethics is a persona! ethic, or it is no ethic at all. But it is 
equally true that environmental ethics must go public or, likewise, it will be 
no ethic at all. Enforcement is more appropriate in communal space, and the 
environment is communal space. 
2 Concern and concert; cheating and coercion 
The environment, a public good, cannot be a private matter only; how we 
act must be collective, institutional, coordinated, corporate. In a community, 
there are things we cannot do unless we do them together. Let us analyse 
ways in which this requires civic law protecting natural value. 
Many environmental problems result from the incremental aggregation of 
actions that are individually beneficial. A person may be doing what would 
be, taken individually, a perfectly good thing, a thing they have a right to do, 
were they alone, but which, taken in collection with thousands of others 
doing the same thing, becomes a harmful thing. These actions must be 
regulated when aggregated. This is Garret! Hardin's tragedy of the commons 
(1968). Pursuit of individual advantage destroys the commons. 
Here, contrary to Adam Smith, there is no invisible hand. Hardin found 
that solutions will often require "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon." A 
community nearing the carrying capacity of its resource base will have to 
curb short-term self-interest for the long-term good of all. Long-term 
sustainability requires suppressing short-term desires. Humans can and 
often do the wrong thing – "by nature* we might say – and law needs to 
"civilize" these instincts. 
Our evolutionary history shaped us for short-range tribal survival, 
seldom asking us to consider future generations beyond children and 
grandchildren, never figuring in the welfare of others thousands of miles 
away or the incremental build-up of heavy metals. Perhaps a commons 
ethics could work for tribes, but for nations and global commerce, we need 
regulation of the common good. Often we humans are not so much evil as 
thoughtless. Social powers external to the self, such as government or 
business, cause even well intended persons to act against their individual 
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wishes. Those powers can work against environmental ethics; but we wish to 
turn governmental powers toward the building of an environmental ethics. 
The communal good is mutual and requires broad social agreement on 
environmental policy. But it also requires enforcement, for some will be 
tempted to exceed the limits set by policy. This is the problem of "cheaters," 
persons who will in self-interest take advantage of cooperating others. Nor is 
this always consciously intended; individuals may act as they have been 
accustomed to over many decades, without waking up to how these 
customary individual goods are aggregating to bring communal evils to 
which we are unaccustomed. Environmental law will be needed to curb 
prevailing practices. The social contract must be policed. Civic law protects 
natural value. 
This ethic will be voluntary, an enlightened and democratically achieved 
consensus, with the willing support of millions of citizens (as we hope and 
outline in the next section). But this voluntary compliance depends on the 
expectation that even those who do not wish to obey will be required to do 
so. No laws can be enforced without the widespread voluntary compliance of 
citizens; there are never enough enforcement officers to compel everybody. 
But even if 99% of citizens are glad to behave in a certain way, provided that 
all others do, 1% of the citizens will be pressed to freeload, and this will 
trigger bad faith. Minority rights and the right to dissent have also to be 
considered – and enforced! But no-one has the right to harm others, without 
justified cause. Where some destroy public goods entwined with biotic 
community, enforcement can be justified. 
One rotten apple spoils a barrel. The corruption is contagious. Unless a 
society polices out the polluters, the rot will spread. Maybe that is not the way 
it ought to be, had we human nature ideally; but, with human nature realisti-
cally, this is the way it is. This is especially true when: "New occasions teach 
new duties; Time makes ancient good uncouth" (Lowell, 1844, 1966, p. 191). 
Environmental goods have long been assumed as nature's gift. Only in the 
last century did these goods come under jeopardy and threat. Now tacit 
goods have to be made explicit; assumed goods have to be guaranteed by 
legal enforcement. This is going to require nudging people along, where they 
do not wish to go – not yet at least, though they may, in retrospect, be quite 
glad when they get there. Vested interests, often with much inertia, have to be 
divested. Habits have to be de-habituated. Self-interest is easy enough to 
rationalize under the old rationale. This is the way we have been doing it for 
decades; can what was right yesterday be wrong tomorrow? 
Such established self-interest, combining with established and tacit goods, 
will quickly be asserted as individual rights. "My water rights go back to 
1890! What do you mean I can't irrigate with it like I used to because the 
selenium from the return flow is building up and is toxic downstream? That's 
not fair!" But we cannot leave old decisions in place when new information 
comes on line, without in effect making new and different decisions. 
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Nudging people out of their old habits and privileges, shifting patterns of 
right and wrong at shifting levels of scale and scope, is going to require 
enforcement. 
Consider changed attitudes toward smoking and the long effort to mix 
incentive and regulation. Our forefathers did not know what we now know 
about tobacco, any more than they knew about selenium. We require 
tobacco warnings on packages; we prohibit the sale of tobacco to minors. In 
public, you must smoke outside and in the cold. Every cigarette smoker has 
felt pushed around. But it would not have been possible to achieve a 
smoke-free environment without enforcement. Mutatis mutandis, apply this 
to clean air and environmental health. Or to clean water, despite 1890 rights. 
"Liberty" is a virtue word; everybody wants it. "Enforce," the seeming 
contrast, is often pejorative; nobody wants to be forced. But this is 
superficial. In fact one cannot have the freedom one desires without law 
enforcement. Unless thieves are restrained and property laws enforced I am 
not free to own my home. One has more options in a decently ordered 
society. My right to free speech and action requires policing of those who 
would curtail it. Environmental ethics needs to learn to extrapolate and 
innovate these classical arguments into the domain of environmental goods. 
Many of the liberties that we protect are quite precious. I am not even 
free to breathe unless toxic air emissions are enforced. The Clean Air Act of 
1970 turns thirty years of age this year, one of the most successful environ-
mental laws ever. According to the Environmental Protection Agency, air 
pollution has been cut by a third and acid rain by 25%. Cars are 95% 
cleaner. The ozone layer is projected to recover by mid-century. Emissions of 
the six worst air pollutants dropped 33% from 1970-97 despite a 31% 
increase in US population, a 114% rise in productivity and a 127% jump in 
the number of miles driven by Americans in their automobiles. All this 
would not have been possible without enforcing environmental ethics. As 
much could be said for clean water, or environmental health. 
There are useful analogies with the US civil rights movement (I speak, let 
it be noted, as a Southerner, whose great grandparents were slaveowners). 
The US South (often also the North and West) did not desegregate 
voluntarily. Typically, compliance was forced by civil rights legislation. But 
neither was the enforcement unconstitutional, nor was it often violent. Many 
Southerners had a deep sense that it was right, although not something they 
particularly wanted to do. Today, no Southerners would return to the 
segregated South. They are proud of what they have done. 
Environmental enforcement will often be similar. The fluorocarbons were 
removed from refrigerators, mandated by law. The forest industry moved to 
plantations and sustainable forestry, and decried government interference 
locking up too much wilderness. Wolves were returned to Yellowstone, with 
sheep ranchers muttering "Shoot, shovel, and shut up."  But refrigerator 
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makers, foresters and ranchers (or at least their children) are going to be 
proud of their environmental success. 
Enforcement covers a wide spectrum of occasions when an agent acts 
contrary to that agent's own wishes. owing to forces brought to bear from 
the outside. The main idea is of external restraints counter to internal 
desires. These may involve boycotts, tariffs, fines, prohibition of access, 
impounded equipment and funds, or jail. Enforcement need not be violent; 
indeed it will seldom be. 
Unfortunately, enforcement can be in the interests of injustice as well as 
justice, and this is as true environmentally as socially. Enforcement is often 
used to maintain undesirable practices in the service of privilege and vested 
interests. Enforcement can settle issues the wrong way, and it often has. But 
few social issues have been settled the right way without enforcement – not 
slavery, not child labor, not women's suffrage, not workplace safety, not 
minimum wage, not civil rights. 
I concede that an enforced ethic is incomplete. I do not murder, or pol-
lute, for fear of punishment. If so, my ethics is not autonomous; it is 
nominal. Enforced ethics is necessary but not sufficient for environmental 
ethics. But with enforcement, we can perhaps change habits, and once 
habituated, the behavior may be internalized. There is enforcement initially, 
when the actors have as yet no will; but, having done it, afterward the actors 
come to make up the former deficiency of will. The automobile industry was 
forced to clean up, but there are no auto makers who now wish to return to 
the cars of the sixties. 1 agree that, where there is frequent use, one ought not 
camp near lakes, or build fires in alpine country; and I do not need a 
backcountry ranger to make me behave this way. 
Enforcement will tend to be for the status quo, when what is as often 
needed is enforcement to produce change. Enforcement will be part of the 
establishment, and environmental ethics is often anti-establishment, that is, 
reformatory. Enforcement will have a certain prestige. 'That's the law!" with 
the suppressed premise that it's a good law and ought to be obeyed. Then we 
must assert that enforcement does not carry its own credentials, but needs its 
own authorization and justification. Enforcement is no substitute for 
argument. We do not want coercion to substitute for intelligence, but we also 
recognize that intelligent action will need enforcement on those not so 
enlightened. Meanwhile, there always underlies such action the prior 
question of whether enforcement is just. Lawyers have to argue, even if 
policemen do not. Philosophers have no powers of enforcement; they can 
only argue. They question authority. That is why I am arguing for the 
legitimate and rational use of enforcement. 
A general moral principle is that the excessive use of force is unwar-
ranted, and that applies here. There will be debate about appropriate means 
and degrees of enforcement. Also, we will hope for arguments that while the 
enforced behavior may be contrary to the actor's desires, it is not contrary to 
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that actor's welfare. My concern is whether enforcement is moral, compared 
with caring, and I conclude only halfway so. Here, as elsewhere in ethics, one 
wants enforcement in the service of desirable ends, appropriate caring, 
regulated by constitutional processes, preferably those of democracy. 
3 Democratic environmental ethics 
Hardin's "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon" leads to the question of 
how far an environmental ethic can be democratic. The answer is complex. 
We recall, amused and chastened, Winston Churchill's quip that "Democ-
racy is the worst form of government, except for all the others." Democracy, 
though the best alternative we have, is not entirely well suited for environ-
mental protection. If environmental policy is to be just, and also enforced, 
such law ought be enacted and policed through democratic process. This 
requires some thinking through. A non-democratic government might 
enforce a just environmental policy, but it would be better to have a 
democratic environmental ethics. 
Two places where humans pursue their values most zealously are in 
politics and economics. Other domains of value, such as school and church, 
are no less important, for these also critically help us to form a concept of 
natural value. Still, in the modern world humans intensely value democracy 
and capitalism. In business we are consumers; in politics we are citizens. 
These concerns are allies but they are also in tension. Capitalism can be 
indifferent to values outside the economic domain (political, religious, 
aesthetic, ecological). Capitalism has produced wealth, but it has distributed 
it rather inequitably, while often claiming that it allots wealth meritoriously 
to those who work hard, efficiently and intelligently. Here we typically think 
that government is needed to regulate business on matters such as worker 
safety, minimal wage, or minority hiring, or the rights of labor and dangers 
of unfair competition. Law is needed to preserve those domains of value 
that cannot safely be left to the open marketplace. 
This ought to extend to environmental concerns – so the democrats (and 
republicans too!) now argue. For this superintending of commerce we turn 
to government (aided by school and church) to forge a community bound by 
ties of mutual service, rather than mere commercial exchange. Natural 
resource decisions have been long considered primarily economic decisions. 
Lands under private ownership were bought and sold in markets and cared 
for under economic incentives. Even public lands, in the commons, could 
best be managed with a cost/benefit approach; we were interested in what 
goods we could collectively harvest from them. 
Shifting concepts of natural value, however, now mean that many, even 
most, of the values carried by natural systems cannot be safely left to 
unregulated capitalist markets. We no longer want a purely economic 
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conception of the natural good, any more than we want a purely economic 
conception of the social good. Hence we look to democracy to insure that 
these kinds of natural values are sufficiently protected by the regulation of 
economics, by removing some natural values from economic access, or, 
where we do consume resources, by creating incentives or prohibitions to 
obtain the balance of other natural and social goods that we value as 
citizens. 
Regulation polices these interconnections to see that the economic ones 
stay in their legitimate domain. Environmental regulation has arisen to 
protect by national will environmental values whose protection cannot be 
left to economic interests alone. A democracy places the constraint of the 
general will on those who would degrade the commons. We sometimes 
legislate morality, at least in minimum essential or common denominator 
areas. In environmental policy, there must be a management ethic for the 
commons – about soil, air, water, pollution, environmental quality, the ozone 
layer, mutagens, wildlife, the eagle as a national symbol, endangered species, 
future generations 
Not only is the environment a public good, but further, most remaining 
wildlands are public lands - national forests, parks, wilderness areas, 
seashores, grasslands, wildlife refuges, lands under the Bureau of Land 
Management, state or county parks and forests.  These areas are largely 
managed for multiple use and only semiwild; still they constitute a major 
component of the natural environment They also contain most of the relict 
pristine wildlands, as nearly as these anywhere remain. One cannot look to 
the market to produce or protect the multiple values that citizens enjoy in 
general on public lands, much less in wilderness areas, since many of the 
values sought here are not, or not simply, economic ones.  A nation needs 
collective choices producing a public land ethic.  
Democracy, though more admired than is capitalism, is no more perfect. 
The humans who gather to do business together are the same humans who  
gather to form government. They do not leave behind one human nature and  
take on another when they move from marketplace to courthouse – even  
though the values at stake differ. If human nature is sometimes flawed, these  
flaws will as soon turn up in government as in business. We have largely 
thought that democracy is the form of government best able to combine 
individual freedoms and mutual cooperation with checks on these flaws in 
human nature. With its more comprehensive sense of the public good, with  
all the citizens cross-checking each other, democracy can put checks on the 
flaws in human nature that will make the unregulated market inhumane. 
But we have also to realize that democracy can itself be a flawed institu-
tion. A tough question is whether democracy can discipline itself enough to 
be environmentally rational A test of a democracy is whether its citizens 
can learn to practice enlightened constraint, developing an ethic for the use 
of the environment, and more, developing ethical concern for the whole 
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commonwealth of a human society set in its ecosystems. One thing that 
democracy can produce is debate, discussion about values (though, alas, it 
does not always do so); and we are more likely to uncover and conserve all 
of the natural values at stake when issues have been well debated. 
In this debate, an initial problem is that ordinary people often lack the 
needed expertise. Popular desires are not always a useful guide to environ-
mentally wise or just decision. especially about complicated matters that 
involve judging risks or balancing tradeoffs. Selenium is as necessary for 
human health as it is toxic. At how many parts per million of selenium in 
the drinking water, or in the ducks shot on the marsh, or the fish caught in 
the river, do we pass from the healthy to the tolerable and then to the toxic? 
One needs to trust experts. 
Experts may concede that their knowledge is incomplete, and what then? 
Apply the precautionary principle. But then one needs experts to know 
where the precautionary thresholds lie, if such there are. One needs time to 
realize the results, although the actors are impatient for decisions. Just how 
much old-growth forest is required for those spotted owls? That is not the 
kind of question one puts to popular vote. Who is competent to decide? 
That is not the kind of question one puts to popular vote either. To the 
contrary, politically popular answers are as likely to be wrong as right. 
The Endangered Species Act requires consultation when a project in- 
volving federal funds is likely to place an endangered species in jeopardy. 
Permitting depends on what is called a "biological opinion." There has been 
a fight to keep these opinions strictly "biological," meaning not "economic" 
or "political," certainly not "democratic." Such biological opinions, rendered 
by biologists and their supervisors, will be enforced. The laws that require 
and enforce such opinions are democratically achieved, perhaps also 
politically biased, and they could be changed, if there were sufficient social 
pressures. Meanwhile, those who cherish democracy must turn over some 
decisions to experts. 
Environmental concern tests the popular will for long-term decisions. 
There are lag times for effects, as with aerosol sprays and carbon dioxide 
emissions. Future generations are not here to vote today. One is tempted to 
discount the future environmentally. Although environmentalism has 
increasingly become popular, it is also true that what environmentalists want 
is usually out of step with the immediately prevailing majority. Environmen-
talists are frequently nudging the majority where it does not yet quite want 
to go. Another way of putting this is that environmentalists make explicit 
what is as yet latent in the public mind. Environmentalists use law to do this, 
because otherwise people wake up too late. "You never miss the water until 
the well runs dry." 
Most people are anthropocentric. Only people vote. But the most seminal 
environmental laws push further than concern for civic values. They 
recognize how civic values are entwined with natural values. People need to 
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vote with a concern for endangered species, for humane hunting, for marine 
mammals, for wilderness. The scale and scope of environmental affairs is 
typically decades, even centuries. The scale and scope of Congress can 
sometimes match that, but the scale is often two years, or even the election 
three months away. If citizens insist on short-sighted, immediate, humanistic 
values, then Congressional representatives, who have to be re-elected every 
two years, and Senators, who have to be elected every six, will not be in a 
much better position than corporate executives whose stockholders insist on 
maximum dividends every quarter, without regard for the long-range health 
of the business. We can be tempted to vote for the legislator who promises 
rewards now; those who do not will be out of office next election. 
This can mean decisions that are not really sustainable over the genera-
tions of our children and grandchildren. The half-life of a politician is about 
four years; the half-life of a corporate director is twice that. The half-life of 
a forest is about a century. The half-life of a species is several million years. 
The half-life of a plutonium dump is almost forever. All this means that 
democracies need to seek longer-term views, and more appropriate 
supporting laws, than voting citizens are inclined naturally to supply. 
One way we do this is with checks and balances. The judiciary is not that 
branch of government placed under immediate democratic control; to the 
contrary it is relatively free of it. Judges do not have any more environmental 
expertise than ordinary people, but they have the power and legal obligation 
to consult experts and to take longer-range views. They must apply laws that 
they do not make; our democratically elected representatives make them. 
Such laws must also be constitutional. But judges do not answer directly to 
democratic will. They listen to argument. They rather consider what is just, 
or right, what optimizes the greatest good for die greatest number – and that 
means, environmentally, what combines civic law with the greatest protection 
of environmental value. 
4 Human rights, responsibilities, and caring for nature 
Perhaps one will conclude that the only enforceable environmental ethics is 
the sort that protects humans from harms. Anthropocentric caring for what 
humans have at stake in nature will be the most persuasive part, politically 
correct, and readily enforceable, because it builds on a classical humanistic 
legacy, enforcing justice where persons threaten other persons. One ought 
not to harm other persons, and this can be readily extrapolated to environ- 
mental harms. We might call this a right to normal living, where "normal" 
becomes "normative" about the natural givens  air, soil, water, living space 
– when such traditional givens are jeopardized by encroaching human 
activities. One ought to have "sustainability"; this sustainability enters as an 
ingredient of environmental health. 
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If one has a right to national security and hence the Department of 
Defense, one has a right to environmental security and hence the Environ-
mental Protection Agency. If one has a right to civic security, and hence the 
sheriffs, one has a right to environmental security, and hence the police lock 
up the illegal dumpster or shut down the nonconforming industrial plant. 
Protection against undue harms has long been the province of judicial 
power. Rights, legally claimed and enforced, must be coordinated with 
responsibilities. Thus your right to clean water is my responsibility not to 
pollute the streams, and one cannot be enforced without the other. If social 
security can be mandated, so can environmental security, 
In these environmental laws, however, humans do not always have them-
selves at the focus of every evaluation, as for example with laws about 
cockfighting, bullfighting or leghold traps. Over most of the nation, hunters 
are now required, many against their will, to use steel shot when hunting 
water fowl. Ducks feed on spent shot that falls into their ponds, needing grit 
for their gizzards, and afterward die slowly from lead poisoning. Two or 
three million ducks and geese were dying this way, until law required the 
steel shot – against a long struggle of resistance by hunters and munitions 
manufacturers. 
In 1992, Coloradoans prohibited spring bear hunting, as well as bear 
hunting by dogs or over bait. Hunted in the spring, a sow is taken and her 
cubs starve. Hunted spring or fall, dogs chased a bear relentlessly, a cruel 
and unfair hunt. The prohibition was made by state referendum, a majority 
decision, with 70% of voters rejecting the hunt. This is a fully democratic 
decision. It is also enforced, unwillingly, on those who wish to hunt bears. 
A sign ia Rocky Mountain National Park urges visitors not to harass the 
bighorn sheep: "Respect their right to life." Park visitors are prohibited from 
stopping their cars, or walking, along a half mile of road, so as to give the 
sheep freedom to pass at will. The hiking trail up Specimen Mountain, a 
favorite one, is closed during lambing season, several months in the spring. 
The general park ethic is that if you are interfering with any animal's 
behavior, you are too close. Back off. One ought to give animals their 
freedom, no matter how much you wish to get up closer for that marvelous 
take-home photograph. All such regulations am enforced. 
A Wyoming rancher built a wire mesh fence, twenty-eight miles long and 
five feet high, to protect his cattle-grazing land from antelope. He also hoped 
to scatter or destroy the herd, because there was a likelihood that wildlife 
authorities would declare the area critical habitat, and this would make 
difficult or impossible stripmining the area for coal. An early, severe winter 
(1983-4) followed; snows prevented the antelope from foraging elsewhere; 
and the fence blocked their migration to snow-free areas. About 1,500 
antelope were threatened with starvation. The fence was put up and taken 
down over several winters, and finally, in a series of appeals which went all 
the way to the US Supreme Court, the courts ordered the fence removed or 
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rebuilt. The case was complex, turning on wildlife as a public good more 
than on animal cruelty, but concern for animal welfare was an important 
factor. Again, civic law protected natural value. 
That we can at times be legally required to be "humane" is a revealing 
choice of words. We are treating humanely something that is not human. 
Such an ethic is often persuasive, because we obviously share with animals 
the capacity to suffer. Inflicting pain requires justification. If the infraction 
is serious enough, you will have to answer for it in court. Notice, however, 
that environmental regulation can enforce what some consider to be 
inhumane, as when Yellowstone Park regulations forbade the rescue of a 
drowning bison, insisting that "nature should take its course." 
Some laws extend to species and ecosystems. The US Congress has 
lamented, in the Endangered Species Act (1973), the lack of "adequate 
concern (for) and conservation (of)" species, which have "esthetic, ecological, 
educational, historical, recreational, and scientific value to the Nation and 
its people" (Sec. 2), and mandated species protection. The Act was tougher 
than first realized. It has stood over a quarter century, protecting endan-
gered species beyond any reasonable expectation of benefits, interpreted in 
the usual medical, industrial, agricultural, or even recreational senses, as for 
example with saving the snail darter or spotted owl. The National Forest 
Management Act (1976), the Federal Land Policy and Management Act 
(1976) and the Wilderness Act (1964) are interpreted in terms of "ecosystem 
management," and the US Forest Service can prefer to say that it manages 
for the "multiple values" on public lands, rather than for the traditional 
"multiple uses." 
5 Humans versus nature 
Can and ought we enforce environmental ethics if this benefits nature over 
against humans? We use "versus" provocatively, in the legal court-case sense: 
Humans v. Nature. 
Some will immediately claim that this need not be "versus"; that is too 
adversarial. What one seeks is humans "with" nature, "in" nature, humans 
"and" nature, "caring for" nature; or some more complementary and 
inclusive conjoining of the two. The central problem is precisely this dualist 
"versus"; and so – critics will lament – I phrase the problem the wrong way. 
Look for harmony, not opposition; and write laws that way. 
So let me hasten to state that one ought to legislate win-win solutions, 
where this is possible. Culture and nature have entwined destinies. People 
cannot be healthy in a sick environment. Faced with a dilemma, we try to 
find a way out by showing that no hard choices need to be made. Make the 
laws so that there is the greatest good for the greatest number, and include 
the fauna and flora in the cost/benefit analysis. Look for multiple values, 
360 
ENFORCING ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS 
natural and cultural, as does the Forest Service and the EPA. My critics will 
twist and turn to show that the "versus" can be eliminated. 
Consider poverty in developing nations. The Rio Declaration insists, "All 
States and all people shall cooperate in the essential task of eradicating 
poverty as an indispensable requirement" (United Nations Environment 
Programme, Rio Declaration, Principle 5), presumably using legislation to do 
so. It also declares, rather piously: "Human beings are at the centre of 
concerns for sustainable development" and that these humans "are entitled 
to a healthy and productive life in harmony with nature" (Principle 1). 
Typically, it turns out that humans are not really winning, if they are 
sacrificing the nature that is their life-support system. Humans win by 
conserving nature – and these winners include the poor and the hungry. "In 
order to achieve sustainable development, environmental protection shall 
constitute an integral part of the development process and cannot be 
considered in isolation from it" (Principle 4). 
But I remain to claim, with equal insistence, that daily the decisions we 
face are "versus" in the win-lose sense. We face disjunctions as often as 
conjunctions. Just as typically, nature is sacrificed for human development; 
most development is of this kind. Conservation dilemmas are very much 
with us in developing countries. My analysis is not of some ideal but of the 
real world. As much as anyone else, I will convert such situations into 
win-win if I can. Only I face the reality that they do not so easily or so 
soon convert. 
  Not all development is justified, but that which gets people feed seems 
basic and urgent. Then nature should lose. Surely that is just. James P. Sterba 
formulates this as "a principle of human preservation." 
Actions that are necessary for meeting one's basic needs or the basic 
needs of other human beings are permissible even when they re-
quire aggressing against the basic needs of individual animals and 
plants or even of whole species or ecosystems. 
(Sterba 2000, p. 34; cf. Sterba 1998, p. 128) 
On that principle, any laws protecting species, ecosystems, animals, or plants, 
when this thwarts meeting the basic needs of humans, will be unjust. Sterba 
desires, he claims, a "peacemaking model" for his ethic (1998, pp. 1-13); but 
he here becomes quite "aggressive." 
Two words in this principle: "necessary" and "basic." will prove elastic 
enough that various debaters can shrink and stretch them to their liking. 
Perhaps they can thereby make the principle effectively cover a wide range of 
cases. But I am now arguing that environmental ethics and law ought, at 
times, to run counter to this principle. Let us move through a spectrum of 
cases building this argument. 
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Members of the Hopi tribe, native Americans in Arizona, wish to engage 
in a ceremony that requires killing golden eagles. The eagle is captured as a 
chick, kept well, even reverenced, for months, then ritually suffocated, 
sending the spirit of the eagle to fly to the world of their Hopi ancestors, 
informing the ancestors of what the Hopis need in today's world – no doubt 
including their basic needs, since many of the Hopis are poor. The ancestors 
engage powers that ensure that these needs are met. The eagle chicks are 
taken from Hopi sacred lands, but these are now often in national parks and 
monuments. Although the Hopis received permission from the US Fish and 
Wildlife to take up to forty eaglets, they were refused by National Park 
Service officials, on grounds of wildlife conservation. In particular, they 
were refused admission to Wupatki National Monument, outside Flagstaff, 
Arizona. The tribe has protested (Stevens and Velushi 1999; Shaffer 1999). 
By Sterba's principle, if, in their culture, this is a necessary way of meeting 
their basic needs, this refusal is unjust and should not be enforced. So much 
the worse for the eagles. I argue to the contrary that the Hopis were 
justifiably refused admission; and, should they persist, should be forcibly 
prevented. In our Western view, of course, this ceremony is not "necessary" 
to meet their "basic" needs. To retain Sterbafs principle we must become 
"Eurocentric," though he dislikes this (1998, pp. 116-21), and impose our 
view on theirs. Meanwhile those who engage in the ceremony believe that it 
is "necessary" to have this eagle contact their ancestors to supply their needs. 
This view, I maintain, is false. There is no scientific, ethical, social, 
religious, or other evidence that the sacrificed eaglet improves their lives. 
Probably one could find psychosomatic evidence; that those who believe so 
are reinforced in their resolution, courage, thrift, ingenuity, and might indeed 
manage to meet their basic needs better in result. We ought to impose our 
view on theirs, and the imposition couples our Western world-view with a 
valuing of what eagles are in themselves. 
Ethicists would certainly prohibit the Hopis if they were sacrificing their 
children. In that case, you would appeal to human rights, and to the 
obligation of the government to protect the rights of the would-be sacrificed 
child. My argument is by extension, I do not claim, however, that the eagle 
has rights, but that the eagle has intrinsic value, intensified in this case by 
concern for a threatened species, and that such value overrides protection of 
the false beliefs of the Hopis. One need not wait to persuade the Hopis of 
this; one ought enforce this ethic. Even if, in multicultural tolerance, you 
wish to remain agnostic about the Hopi belief, one ought not to "agress 
against" eagles to protect a doubtful human belief about ways to meet basic 
needs. Surely native Americans, though thwarted by the white man's law, 
have a venerable tradition of respect for animals, and they can find some 
way of revising their belief system so as to spare the eagles. 
In the United Kingdom, as elsewhere, Orthodox Jews have long practiced 
kosher slaughter. This is "necessary" in their view for the proper service of 
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God. Are not religious needs quite "basic"? The slaughterer, or shohet, slits 
the throat; butchering is designed to remove as much blood as possible. Jews 
have been commanded not to eat the blood, out of respect for life and in 
reminder that life belongs to God. Also, rabbis have long argued that this is 
humane slaughter. 
Times change, and today there is a stun gun available that instantly 
paralyzes the animal with an electric shock, after which it is killed. The 
British government has considered legislation to require the use of such stun 
guns, on grounds that this is now the most humane method of slaughter. 
Some Orthodox rabbis have objected, since this prevents the maximal 
removal of blood, and the meat is not kosher (Linzey and Cohn-Sherbok 
1997, pp. 54-6; Farm Animal Welfare Council, 1985, pp. 19-20, 24-5). 
Should this law be enacted and enforced? 
I argue that such enforcement is justified. I can concede that Jews worship 
God with their observances (as 1 cannot concede that the eagle contacts 
Hopi ancestors). I concede that religious needs are basic. But I cannot bring 
myself to believe that the Jewish God commands continuing traditional 
kosher slaughter, if this causes the animal more suffering. I would plead the 
case on the strength of their own premises, as well as mine, out of reverence 
for life and of compassion for sentient animals. Nevertheless, should they 
insist on their orthodoxy, I am prepared to resist it by enforcing civic law. 
In twenty years Africa's black rhinoceros population declined from 
65,000 to 2,500, a loss of 97%; the species faces imminent extinction. There 
has been loss of habitat due to human population growth; but the primary 
direct cause is poaching for horns. People cannot eat horns; but they can buy 
food with the money from selling them. Zimbabwe has a hard-line shoot-to- 
kill policy for poachers, and over 150 poachers have been killed (Berger and 
Cunningham 1994). 
Lest I seem callous, let me insert caveats to guard against inhumanity. 
One ought to take much care to see that poachers have other alternatives for 
overcoming their poverty. Such obligations equal any obligations we have to 
protect the rhinos. If we were zealous, we could make poaching unnecessary. 
Still, when I face facts in the pressing context in which these Zimbabwean 
poachers are today caught up, it is highly probable that some of these 
poachers have no feasible alternative available to them for meeting their 
basic needs. 
I also maintain that such policy is right. Given the fact that rhinos have 
been so precipitously reduced, given that the Zimbabwean population is 
escalating – the average married woman there desires to have six children 
(Bongaarts 1994) – one ought to put the black rhino as a species first and 
make poaching illegal, even if basic human needs thereby go unmet. Anyone 
familiar with sub-Saharan Africa will realize that, otherwise, there will be no 
rhinos, or elephants, or lions, or gorillas. Sterba's principle is aggressive 
indeed. Always putting human basic needs first guarantees, sooner or later, 
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the extinction of every jeopardized species that cannot be preserved as a 
food animal. Nature co-opted to feed people is seldom wild nature saved. 
Royal Chitwan National Park in Nepal is a primary sanctuary for Bengal 
tigers and the Asian rhinoceros, both extremely endangered species. Other 
species protected in the area are the sloth bear, the pygmy hog, the swamp 
deer, the black buck, the Asian rock python, and the gharial crocodile (the 
most endangered crocodile). The region, in lowland Nepal, was too 
malarious to live in year-round until the 1950s. In earlier years, what is now 
the park area was kept as a hunting preserve for the Rana rulers of Nepal in 
the dry season. Oddly, the tigers and rhinos survived because of the 
mosquitoes, 
Following a mosquito eradication campaign in mid-century, Nepalis 
began to move into the region. The migrants cleared the forests and started 
cultivating crops, also poaching. In 1973, to increase protection, the hunting 
preserve was designated a national park. Nepalis were surrounding it. The 
population of the Terai (lowland) region was 36,000 to 1950; in less than a 
decade it was one million. With one of the highest birthrates in the world, 
and with the influx continuing, the population in 1991 was 8.6 million, 90% 
of them poor, 50% of them desperately poor (Nepal and Weber 1993; 
Shrestha 1997). 
No-one is allowed to live in the park. People complain that they cannot 
cut grasses, graze cattle and buffalo, or timber the park at will. They are 
allowed to cut thatch grasses several days a year, and 30% of park income is 
given to Village Development Committees. The Royal Nepalese Army, with 
800 soldiers, is responsible for preventing poaching, grazing, cutting grasses, 
pilfering timber, and permanent habitation of the land. Enforcement is quite 
rigorous. In 1985f 554 violations were fined and 1,306 cattle were im-
pounded. In 1993 thirty-seven rhino poachers were apprehended. The 
soldiers also do what they can to improve the lot of the people. But being 
hungry is not a sufficient reason to sacrifice the park, and this is legally 
enforced, no matter that human needs go unmet. 
Again, my caveats. One needs to fix this problem by attacking its root 
social causes. But, alas, in a recent visit to Nepal, I did not find any answers 
in sight You can stretch the word "necessary" to make it unnecessary for the 
Nepalis to sacrifice the park – had they a different kind of society, had they 
more foreign aid than they do. (Even now about one half of the govern-
ment's revenue depends on foreign aid and borrowing; one third of the hard 
currency entering the country is aid.) Yes, there are other options in 
principle, and the destruction is unnecessary – logically, ideally, eventually. 
But fact of the matter again is that, practically, no such options are viable 
for most of these nine million Nepalis. "Justice for here and now," Sterba's 
emphasis, requires decisions in law enforcement that save nature and leave 
basic human needs unmet. 
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But by Sterba's principle, these millions will be justified in destroying 
Royal Chitwan National Park, the last refuge in Nepal of the tigers and 
rhino, also of a dozen other species. Unless civic law can protect natural 
value, long before their needs are met, most of the biodiversity in Nepal will 
be gone. Humans ought not always and everywhere dump their mistakes, 
mismanagements and misfortunes onto jeopardized wildlife; and basic needs 
unmet is no unchallengeable exception. We might not make this argument 
for every endangered beetle or nematode worm, but the lithe, supple cat, 
epitome of feline power, joined with the other charismatic species, displays 
richness in value that one ought not to sacrifice for a temporary and 
ultimately futile solution to these deep human problems. 
6 Global enforcement: nature and the nations 
Enforcement requires government; there is no world government. But 
environmental ethics has gone global in scale: climate change and global 
warming, fishing in the deep seas, population control, developed/developing 
nations, inequitable distribution of wealth driving environmental degrada-
tion, trade in ivory, tiger skins and rhino horns. Can and ought there be 
enforcement on this scale? Or will we stay adrift in a multicultural and 
pluralist morass? On national scales, enforcement is possible, but on 
international scales, there is anarchy. At least there is only incentive, never 
command and control. Internationally – at least short of war – there are 
only carrots, never sticks. 
One possibility is that in the burgeoning nations, whether escalating in 
numbers or appetites, enforcement sufficient to provide quality environments 
may be impossible, because it is too demanding on human capacities. 
Quality environments would be desirable, ideally; but realistically, it is 
already too late. In 1970 in only one nation (Chad) was the average person, 
on balance, becoming poorer, with population growth overwhelming 
economic advance. By 1980, the number of such nations had risen to thirty- 
five; by 1990 the number was ninety! (Westing 1993, p. 100). One shudders 
when waiting for the 2000 figure. Under such pressures, civic law is unlikely 
to be able to protect natural values – certainly not tiger habitat, and hardly 
even soil and water quality. 
Escalating populations and consumerism are likely to escalate the need 
for enforcement, at the same time that they escalate its difficulty. Indeed, 
given the human nature about which we earlier worried, even decent 
environments are likely to become uncommon. Perhaps the most we can 
hope for is environmental justice, more or less, in more fortunate regions of 
the globe. 
When it comes to nature, the nations are often as much part of the 
problem as part of the answer. The divisive troubles that arise among the 
world states, with their competing national sovereignties, are not well 
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adapted for harmonious relations with the Earth commons. The "rights" of 
nations, and "rights" as claimed by citizens of these political states are not 
well aligned with the ecology and geography of the planet. The shapes of the 
continents are the result of natural forces, and natural resources lie where 
they lie by nature. On these continents, national boundaries were drawn for 
political reasons and often with minimal attention to natural resources – 
nearly all were drawn before many of the modern essential resources were 
resources at all: coal, electric power, uranium, copper or iron ore. 
People assert their need for a productive and quality environment as 
citizens of nations that have economic policies, political agendas, and laws 
demanding loyalties in support. Their access to natural resources comes 
filtered through political units that are not formed, or continued, with these 
ecologies in mind. They want resources, but the political alignments can 
often mean suboptimal and unjust solutions to the problems of resource 
distribution. Natural resources have to become national resources, and 
"nationalizing" natural resources can be as much part of the problem as part 
of the answer, especially when the sovereign independence of nations is 
asserted without regard for the ecological and social interdependencies of 
these nations. 
But it is a mistake to conclude that nothing is enforceable because, on this 
one Earth, there are 178 sovereign nations. Although there is no world 
government nations can and do enforce, on their own nationals and on other 
parties, the provisions of treaties into which they have entered. The number 
of international treaties that generate environmental law is considerable 
(Kiss 1983; Rummel-Bulska and Osafo 1991; Weiss et al 1992). Providing 
social security is a principal justification for nation-states, a principle of 
justice for both domestic and foreign policy. The transition now needs to 
extend to environmental security and justice, nationally and internationally. 
Consider the possibility that most of these myriad nations could enter 
into a treaty guaranteeing a universal human right to a quality environment 
(Westing 1999). The United Nations General Assembly has decreed: "All 
individuals are entitled to live in an environment adequate for their health 
and well-being" (United Nations General Assembly 1990). A UN-related 
group, the InterAction Council, consisting of over two dozen former heads 
of state, prepared in 1997 a Universal Declaration of Human Responsibilities 
on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (1948). Although that document has not been officially 
adopted by the UN, it does contain widely recognized principles. Of 
particular interest is one of its nineteen principles: 
Article 7: Every person is infinitely precious and must be protected 
unconditionally. The animals and the environment also demand 
protection. All people have a responsibility to protect the air, water 
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and soil of the earth for the sake of present inhabitants and future 
generations. 
(InterAction Council 1997) 
Such language is broad, and, like all international consensus documents, 
subject to interpretation. Still, there is the idea that humans in their 
environments, their biosphere, warrant protection, and all persons may be 
held so responsible. That does not guarantee enforcement; but again, the 
suggestion is that enforcement at some levels and degrees could be 
appropriate. Often such UN resolutions are only a rhetorical veil over power 
relations. But national powers can and do enter into various kinds of 
international relations, which can bring levels of enforcement. 
What start out as hortatory ideals can, in due course, become formal 
international commitments, as happened with the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. This declaration was first promulgated in 1948, and it took 
eighteen years, but by 1966 there had been widely adopted international 
covenants, to which about three quarters of the states on Earth are now 
party. Something like this could be on the horizon for environmental 
concerns. 
Could this ever extend to a more fundamental protection of nature? The 
World Charter for Nature (United Nations General Assembly 1982) is 
another aspirational declaration that might be deepened into formal 
international commitments, eventually guaranteeing appropriate respect for 
nature for what it is itself. That route would probably be by discovering that, 
in trying to assert human rights to and over the environment, the problem is 
deeper than we first thought. Asserting our rights and "aggressing against 
animals, plants, species, ecosystems" that stood in our way, demanding our 
human rights to a quality environment, we would be increasingly confronted 
by population growth and desires for economic advance. 
  By then the tigers and rhinos would long be gone, but we might begin to 
realize that both of these thwarting problems result from regarding nature as 
nothing but natural resources. Environmental justice, so we had thought 
was a matter of settling conflicting human rights claims. Justice is for "just 
us" people. After all, only persons can be just; whooping cranes and sequoia 
trees cannot. Maybe we would realize that it does not follow that persons 
cannot behave rightly or wrongly with regard to animals, plants, nature. It 
might become clearer to us that to see nature and its conservation solely in 
terms of natural resources is as much part of the problem as the answer. 
There is no rule of ethics by which cultural values automatically and always 
trump natural values. Human systems and natural systems have entwined 
destinies; what we ought to seek, indeed what we must seek for any 
workable, or enforceable solution, is a complementary welfare. 
We do not seek more intelligent and sustainable exploitation; when we 
seek that and that only, we overshoot. Maximizers always overshoot. We 
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ought to seek, and enforce, harmony, sustainable development but equally a 
sustainable biosphere, human citizenship in a biotic community, civic law 
protecting natural value. 
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